It is important to find an efficient design-for-testability methodology that satisfies both security and testability, although there exists an inherent contradiction between security and testability for digital circuits. In our previous work, we reported a secure and testable scan design approach by using extended shift registers that are functionally equivalent but not structurally equivalent to shift registers, and showed a security level by clarifying the cardinality of those classes of shift register equivalents (SR-equivalents). However, SR-equivalents are not always secure for scan-based side-channel attacks. In this paper, we consider a scan-based differential-behavior attack and propose several classes of SRequivalent scan circuits using dummy flip-flops in order to protect the scanbased differential-behavior attack. To show the security level of those SRequivalent scan circuits, we introduce a differential-behavior equivalent relation and clarify the number of SR-equivalent scan circuits, the number of differential-behavior equivalent classes and the cardinality of those equivalent classes. key words: design-for-testability, scan design, shift register equivalents, security, scan-based side-channel attack
Introduction
Scan registers or scan chains are proven to be effective in improving the testability of digital circuits [1] , [2] . However, their effect on the circuit, which makes its registers easily accessible from primary inputs and outputs, allows attackers to exploit this opportunity to extract key streams, copy intellectual property (IP), and even manipulate the circuit. This makes it difficult for scan chains to be used, especially in special cryptographic circuits where secret key streams are stored in internal registers. However, sacrificing testability for security will degrade/affect product quality of these circuits, which conflicts with the high demand for reliable secure systems [3] . Fundamentally, the problem lies in the inherent contradiction between testability and security for digital circuits. Hence, there's a need for an efficient solution such that both testability and security are satisfied.
To solve this challenging problem, different approaches have been proposed. In [4] , [5] , a scan-chain design based on scrambling was proposed, where flip-flops are dynamically reordered in a scan chain. An alternative is given in [6] , [7] . In this method, a secure scan-chain architecture with mirror key register (MKR) was introduced. Any crypto chip with the proposed architecture can be switched between test/normal mode (insecure) and normal mode only (secure). A similar scheme using insecure and secure modes is the lock & key security technique proposed in [8] , [9] . It uses a test security controller (TSC) to switch between secure and insecure modes. This method divides the scan chain into smaller subchains of equal length. Moreover, Paul et al. in [10] claims to provide a superior technique compared to the ones mentioned. It is a Vlm-Scan that utilizes some flipflops in a scan chain for authentication to move to test mode. The circuit can proceed to test mode only if the proper sequence of test keys are scanned in to the used flip-flops. The test controller can be tested, which is an advantage compared to the others, however, a long test key sequence is still needed. All of the proposed techniques [4] - [12] add extra hardware outside of the scan chain. This entails several disadvantages such as high area overhead, timing overhead or performance degradation, increased complexity of testing, and limited security for the registers part among others. Sengar et al. discussed a model called secured flippedscan-chain in [13] , which works as conventional scan chains do except that it uses inverters in the scan path to flip part of the register content for protection. Testing the architecture can be done the same way with scan chains, only with additional NOT gates. However, Sengar's approach [13] has not considered the possibility of resetting (to zero) of all flip-flops in the scan chain. In this case, the positions of all inverters, despite a sufficient number, can still be determined by simply scanning out after reset. Thus, the internal state can be identified and the security is breached. To resolve such a reset-based attack, Agrawal et al. [14] introduced an XOR-scan-chain architecture for secure scan design. However, the XOR-scan-chain is required to be reset before feeding in a test pattern, and hence the test response in the scan chain must be scanned out before feeding in the next test pattern, i.e., scanning in a test pattern and scanning out a test response cannot be performed simultaneously, which doubles the test application time compared to the standard scan testing.
In [16] , [18] , we proposed a secure and testable scan design approach by using extended shift registers that are functionally equivalent but not structurally equivalent to shift registers. The proposed extended shift registers include flipped-scan chain of [13] and XOR-scan chain of [14] as special cases. Further, our secure scan architecture can protect reset-based attack by adding one extra flipflop [16] , [18] , and hence thanks to this extra flip-flop and Copyright c 2011 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers the shift-register equivalence of modified scan chains, scanning in a test pattern and scanning out a test response can be performed simultaneously, in the same way as the standard scan testing. The proposed approach is only to replace the original scan register with a modified scan register that requires little area overhead and no performance overhead with respect to normal operation. As for the security, the objective application is mainly to use it for cryptographic circuits though it can be used for IP protection and other purposes. To show the security level for the proposed approach, we clarified the cardinality of those classes of shift register equivalents (SR-equivalents) [17] , [18] . However, SR-equivalents are not always secure for scan-based sidechannel attacks like differential behavior attack of [6] .
In this paper, we consider a scan-based side-channel attack called differential-behavior attack which is an extension of the differential-behavior attack of [6] , and propose several classes of SR-equivalent scan circuits using dummy flip-flops in order to protect the scan-based differentialbehavior attack. To show the security level of those SRequivalent scan circuits, we introduce differential-behavior equivalent relation, and clarify the number of SR-equivalent scan circuits, the number of differential-behavior equivalent classes and the cardinality of those equivalent classes for several linear structure circuits.
SR-Equivalent Circuits
Consider a k-stage shift register shown in Fig. 1 . For the kstage shift register, the input value applied to x appears at z after k clock cycles. Suppose a circuit C with a single input x, a single output z, and k flip-flops as shown in Fig. 2 . If the input value applied to x of C appears at the output z of C after k clock cycles, the circuit C behaves as if it is a k-stage shift register.
A circuit C with a single input x, a single output z, and k flip-flops is called functionally equivalent to a k-stage shift register (or SR-equivalent) if the input value applied to x at any time t appears at z after k clock cycles, i.e., z(t+k) = x(t) for any time t. Figure 3 illustrates an example of 3-stage SRequivalent circuit R 1 . The table in Fig. 3 can be obtained easily by symbolic simulation. As shown in the table, z(3) = x(0), i.e., the input value applied to x appears at z after k = 3 clock cycles, and hence the circuit is SR-equivalent. Although the input/output behavior of R 1 is the same as that of the 3-stage shift register, the internal state behavior of R 1 is different from the shift register. For the shift register SR, the input sequence (x(0), x(1), x(2)) which transfers SR to the state (y 1 (2), y 2 (2), y 3 (2)) is (x(0), x(1), x(2)) = (y 3 (2), y 2 (2), y 1 (2)). The initial state (y 1 (0), y 2 (0), y 3 (0)) can be identified as (y 1 
However, for the SR-equivalent circuit R 1 , the input sequence which transfers R 1 to the state (y 1 (2), y 2 (2), y 3 (2)) is (x(0), x(1), x(2)) = (y 3 (2)⊕y 2 (2), y 2 (2), y 1 (2)) from Fig. 3 , and the initial state (y 1 (0), y 2 (0), y 3 (0)) can be identified as (y 1 (0), y 2 (0), y 3 (0)) = (z(2), z(1), z(0)⊕z (1) ) from the output sequence. Therefore, without the information on the structure of R 1 one cannot control/observe the internal state of R 1 . From this observation, replacing the shift register with an SR-equivalent circuit makes the scan circuit secure.
The SR-equivalent circuit shown in Fig. 3 is a linear feed-forward shift register. SR-equivalent circuits can also be realized by a linear feedback shift register and/or by inserting inverters as shown in Fig. 4 . SR-equivalent circuits can be realized not only by linear feed-forward/feedback shift registers with/without inverters but also by more gen- eral circuits. To illustrate an example, consider a k-stage I 2 LF 2 SR given in Fig. 5 (a) . Here, k = 3. By symbolic simulation illustrated in Fig. 5 (c), the output z(3) becomes x(2)⊕1⊕x(0).
How to Design SR-Equivalent Circuits
To do so, we modify the circuit by adding extra feed-forward from y 1 with inverter to z as shown in Fig. 5 (b) . Then, the modified circuit becomes SR-equivalent.
How to Control/Observe SR-Equivalents
For a synthesized SR-equivalent circuits, the following two problems are important in order to utilize the SR-equivalent circuit as a scan shift register in testing. One problem is to generate an input sequence to transfer the circuit into a given desired state. This is called state-justification problem. The other problem is to determine the initial state by observing the output sequence from the state. This is called state-observation problem.
Consider a 3-stage I 2 LF 2 SR, R 2 , given in Fig. 6 (a). This I 2 LF 2 SR is SR-equivalent. Figure 6 illustrates how to solve state-justification and state-observation problem. By using symbolic simulation, we can derive equations to obtain an input sequence (x(t − 3), x(t − 2), x(t − 1)) that transfers R 2 from any state to the desired final state (y 1 (t), y 2 (t), y 3 (t)) as illustrated in Fig. 6 (b) . Similarly, as illustrated in Fig. 6 (c), we can derive equations to determine uniquely the initial state (y 1 (t − 3), y 2 (t − 3), y 3 (t − 3)) from the output sequence (z(t − 3), z(t − 2), z(t − 1)).
SR-Equivalent Scan Circuits
A scan-designed circuit consists of a single or multiple scan chains and the remaining combinational logic circuit (kernel) as illustrated in Fig. 7 . A scan chain is regarded as a circuit consisting of a shift register with multiplexers that select the normal data from the combinational logic circuit and the shifting data from the preceding flip-flop. Here, we replace the shift register with an SR-equivalent register. The modified scan register is called the SR-equivalent scan register. For example, SR-equivalent scan register S 1 is obtained from SR-equivalent register R 1 as shown in Fig. 8 .
In the proposed secure scan design, to reduce the area overhead as much as possible, not all scan chains are replaced with modified scan registers. As shown in Fig. 9 , only parts of scan chains necessary to be secure are replaced with modified SR-equivalent scan chains that cover secret registers to be protected, and the size of the modified scan chains is large enough to make it secure. Regarding the performance overhead, the delay overhead due to additional XOR gates influences only scan operation, and hence there is no delay overhead for normal operation.
We have considered a scan-designed circuit consists of multiple scan chains as shown in Fig. 7 . However, we may consider a scan-designed circuit with stimulus decomposition circuit and test response compactor. Even for such scandesigned circuits, SR-equivalent scan circuits can be applied to make the circuits more secure. Suppose a circuit under test that includes two registers A and B such that A can be easily controlled by primary inputs during normal operation and B can be easily observed by primary output during normal operation. Then, part of scan chain between A and B can be scanned in thru A from primary inputs and can be scanned out thru B to primary outputs by using normal and scan operations, even if the scan-designed circuit has scan stimulus decompression circuit and test response compactor. Hence, the circuit under test is not secure. However, if we replace the scan chain between A and B by an SR-equivalent scan chain, then this part of scan chain becomes secure independently of other part, i.e., even if the circuit under test has stimulus decompression circuit and test response compactor.
There have been reported several scan-based attacks such as reset-based attack [14] , differential behavior at- tack [6] and discriminator-based attack [15] . In our previous work [16] , [18] , we showed that our secure scan architecture protects the reset-based attack of [14] by adding one extra flip-flop to prohibit scan-after-reset (see Fig. 11 ). The set of differential behaviors used in the differential behavior attack of [6] is a subset of the differential-behavior set defined in the following section. Hence, if it is secure for the differential-behavior attack defined in this paper, it is also secure for the differential behavior attack of [6] . In our proposed secure scan architecture, the scanned-out data from a scan register is not the same as the content of the scan register. Therefore, the attacker cannot obtain the content of the scan register and hence the existing scan-based attacks [6] , [14] , [15] that depend on calculation from scanned data will fail, unless the attacker can identify the configuration of the extended scan register.
In the following section, we consider a differential behavior attack as a scan-based side-channel attack. To protect the attack, we introduce a dummy flip-flop as shown in Fig. 10 . A dummy flip-flop is an extra flip-flop which is inserted in a scan chain but is not used in the original circuit. A circuit consisting of an SR-equivalent scan register and a dummy FF is called an SR-equivalent scan circuit. Figure 10 illustrates three SR-equivalent scan circuits with three types of dummy flip-flops. Figure 11 shows scan design with the SR-equivalent scan circuit.
Differential Behavior
Let us consider the following scan-based attack. First, the circuit under test is reset and then run in normal mode. Next, it is switched to scan mode to scan out the contents of scan registers. These steps are repeated using another input se- quence that is slightly different from the first input sequence. By applying such two input sequences that are slightly different from each other, the contents of scan registers have a single bit or multiple bit difference between two input sequences, i.e., one can insert different values (referred to differential value) into a single or multiple flip-flops between two input sequences (or a pair of input sequences) and observe the differences between the pair of output sequences by scan operation. Such a pair of two scan-out sequences including differential values is called a differential behavior (or d-behavior, for short). Figure 12 shows four d-behaviors for the SR-equivalent scan register S 1 of Fig. 8 (b) . A single differential value is inserted into x, y 1 , y 2 , and y 3 , respectively. Differential-behavior attack. The attack that inserts differential values into SR-equivalent scan registers in normal mode and observes the differential behaviors in scan mode is called a differential-behavior attack. For the differentialbehavior attack, we consider the possibility of the worst case such that arbitrary number of differential values can be inserted into any flip-flops except dummy flip-flops, and that differential values can also be inserted simultaneously from scan-input at any time again and again. Figure 12 shows the fundamental d-behavior set of S 1 of Fig. 8 (b) . Differential-behavior equivalent relation. Let S 1 and S 2 be SR-equivalent scan circuits. S 1 and S 2 are said to be differential-behavior equivalent (or d-behavior equivalent, for short) if the d-behavior sets of S 1 and S 2 are the same. XOR operation of differential value (d) and constant (−) is as follows.
Differential-behavior set. A set of all d-behaviors for an SR-equivalent scan circuit S is called the differentialbehavior set of S (or d-behavior set of S, for short). A set of all single-bit d-behaviors for S is called the fundamental differential-behavior set of S (or fundamental d-behavior set of S, for short).
Then, the following theorem holds. 
, and (−) op (−) = (−), i.e., this op is XOR operation. Hence, the simultaneous propagation of n inserted d-values can be generated by taking XOR of those n fundamental propagations. Therefore, the total propagation is obtained by XOR-superposition of n fundamental propagations. Figure 13 illustrates two examples of Theorem 1. From Theorem 1, we see that two SR-equivalent scan circuits can be identified to be d-behavior equivalent or not, only by checking whether their fundamental behavior sets are the same. 
Identification of Scan Structure
In [17] , [18] , we showed the number of k-stage SRequivalent circuits for each type of circuits and the total number of SR-equivalent circuits with k flip-flops. They are
, for I 2 SR, LF 2 SR, LFSR, I 2 LF 2 SR, and I 2 LFSR, respectively, and the total number of SR-equivalent circuits with k flip-flops is 2 k !/k! − 1. Consider the circuit R 1 of Fig. 8 (a) that is SRequivalent. The total number of SR-equivalent circuits with 3 flip-flops is 2 k !/k! − 1 = 2 3 !/3! − 1 = 6,719. Since they are all functionally equivalent to the 3-stage shift register, their input/output relations are the same for all of them. Therefore, the probability that an attacker can identify it to be R 1 by guessing is 1/6719. The number of 3-stage SR-equivalent LF 2 SR-type circuits is 2 k(k−1)/2 − 1 = 7, and hence the guessing probability is one seventh. However, the guessing probability approaches to zero as the number of flip-flops increases. In the above discussion, we considered only attacks via scan operation for SR-equivalent scan registers. However, if we target SR-equivalent scan circuits, we need to consider differential-behavior attacks.
Suppose the S-equivalent scan register R 1 and the SRequivalent scan circuit S 1 in Fig. 8 . S 1 consists of R 1 . The fundamental d-behavior set of S 1 is shown in Fig. 12 . As explained later in Sect. 6.2, every class of differential behavior equivalents for LF 2 SR-type SR-equivalent scan circuits consists of one element or singleton, i.e., the cardinality of every d-behavior equivalent class is 1. Hence, we can see any SR-equivalent scan circuit that has the same fundamental d-behavior set as that of S 1 is only S 1 itself. Therefore, we can uniquely identify S 1 from the d-behavior set, and hence the structure of S 1 is identified and S 1 is not secure.
The probability that an attacker can identify the configuration of an SR-equivalent scan circuit S approximates to the reciprocal of the cardinality of the class of SR-equivalent scan circuits that are d-behavior equivalent to S. To evaluate the security level against d-behavior attacks, for each type of SR-equivalent scan circuits we clarify the total number of SR-equivalent scan circuits in the class, the number of d-equivalent classes, and the cardinality of those equivalent classes in the following sections.
Cardinality of Differential Behavior Equivalents
From Theorem 2, we see that two SR-equivalent scan circuits can be identified to be d-behavior equivalent or not, only by checking their fundamental behavior sets are the same. Therefore, we consider only fundamental behaviors from now on. Since a differential value can be inserted in y 1 , y 2 , . . ., and y k , the number of different d-behavior sets (the number of equivalent classes) including SR becomes
The total number of SR-equivalent k-stage LF 2 SR-type scan circuits including SR is 2 k(k−1)/2 − 1. Hence, the cardinality of every equivalent class is 1, i.e., singleton.
As for SR-equivalent k-stage LFSR-type scan circuits, we can obtain similarly, i.e., the number of SR-equivalent scan circuits, the number of d-behavior equivalent classes, and the cardinality of those equivalent classes are the same as those of LF 2 SR-type scan circuits. 
The total number of d-equivalent classes is 2 k(k−1)/2 − 1. Hence, there exists an equivalent class whose cardinality is at least 2 k − 1. As for SR-equivalent k-stage I 2 LFSR-type scan circuits without dummy FF, we can obtain similarly, i.e., the number of SR-equivalent scan circuits, the number of d-behavior equivalent classes, and the cardinality of those equivalent classes are the same as those of I 2 LF 2 SR-type scan circuits without dummy FF. Fig. 14. In the case that a constant 0 or 1 is connected to the normal input of one dummy FF, there are 2k cases. In the case that a normal input of other FF is connected to the normal input of one dummy FF, there are 3k(k − 1)/2 cases. Therefore, the total number of SRequivalent k-stage I 2 SR-type scan circuits with one dummy FF is
Inserting a differential value becomes either inserting a differential value into a FF or inserting two differential values into two FFs. Therefore, the total number of d-equivalent classes is
Hence, there exists an equivalent class whose cardinality is at least Fig. 14. In the case that a constant 0 or 1 is connected to the normal input of one dummy FF, there are 2k cases. In the case that a normal input of other FF is connected to the normal input of one dummy FF, there are 3k(k − 1)/2 cases. Therefore, the total number of SR-equivalent k-stage LF 2 SR-type scan circuits with one dummy FF is
Similar to the discussion of Sect. 6.4, inserting a differential value becomes either inserting a differential value into a FF or inserting two differential values into two FFs. Therefore, the total number of d-equivalent classes is
On the other hand, the number of scan circuits is
Therefore, there exists an equivalent class whose cardinality is at least
Fig. 14 Total number of patterns with one dummy FF. 
The total number of d-equivalent classes is
As for SR-equivalent k-stage I 2 LFSR-type scan circuits with one dummy FF, we can obtain similarly, i.e., the number of SR-equivalent scan circuits, the number of d-behavior equivalent classes, and the cardinality of those equivalent classes are the same as those of I 2 LF 2 SR-type scan circuits with one dummy FF.
Enumeration Results by SREEP-2
In the previous sections, for each type of SR-equivalent scan circuits with/without dummy FF, we have clarified the total number of SR-equivalent scan circuits in the class, the number of d-equivalent classes, and the cardinality of those equivalent classes. Regarding the cardinality of d-equivalent classes, we showed the existence of an equivalent class whose cardinality is at least of the size. Tables 1 and 2 show the summary. From Table 1 , two classes of LF 2 SR 
and LFSR are not secure because their guaranteed cardinality is 1. However, all other classes in Table 1 and Table 2 . The enumeration results for SR-equivalent scan circuits without and with dummy FF are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 , respectively. The third column shows the number of SR-equivalent scan circuits in each class of SR-equivalent scan circuits. The fourth column shows the number of d-equivalent classes. The fifth column shows the guaranteed cardinality that is derived by dividing the value of third column by the value of fourth column. Hence, it is guaranteed there exists an equivalent class whose cardinality is larger than or equal to the guaranteed cardinality. Note that there might exist an equiv- alent class whose cardinality is smaller than the guaranteed one. The sixth column shows the range of cardinality that denotes the range from the minimum size to the maximum size among actual d-equivalent classes. The minimum size and the maximum size were obtained by enumerating all those d-behavior equivalent classes for SR-equivalent scan circuits by SREEP-2.
As for the number of SR-equivalent scan circuits and the number of d-equivalent classes, theoretical values computed from the expressions in Sect. 6 coincide with the actual values obtained from SREEP-2. As for the guaranteed cardinalities, they are all exactly within the range of cardinality. Hence, it is indeed guaranteed that there exist equivalent classes whose cardinality is larger than the guaranteed cardinality.
Next, let us consider the overhead of SR-equivalent scan circuits. The performance or delay overhead for normal operation is zero. The delay overhead due to extra XOR gates influences only scan operation. Regarding the area overhead, as mentioned in Sect. 3, not all scan registers are replaced with SR-equivalent scan registers but only the registers necessary to be secure are replaced with SR-equivalent scan registers, as shown in Fig. 9 . So, the area overhead of whole scan circuits is expected to be low. Further, the area overhead of each SR-equivalent scan register can be very low. Figure 15 shows an example of the outcome of an SR-equivalent 16-stage I 2 LF 2 SR-type scan register without dummy FF obtained by SREEP-2 under the constraint of at most two XOR gates. Hence, the area overhead is very low.
Conclusions
In this paper, we considered a scan-based differentialbehavior attack and proposed several classes of SRequivalent scan circuits using dummy flip-flops in order to protect the scan-based differential-behavior attack. In order to show the security level of those extended scan circuits, we introduced differential-behavior equivalent relation, and clarified the number of SR-equivalent scan circuits, the number of differential-behavior equivalent classes and the cardinality of those equivalent classes. It is shown that the proposed extended scan design is very secure as well as easily testable, the normal delay or performance overhead is zero, and the area overhead can be very low.
